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Preface 
This publication is part of a continuing research programme that seeks to examine 
aspects of risk and uncertainty with respect to environmental management. Previous 
reports and publications concentrated, firstly, on providing a general summary of aspects 
of risk and uncertainty that impinge on environmental management; secondly, on the 
relationship between environmental impact assessment and risk assessment; thirdly, on 
the place of risk assessment in the general decision-making process; and fourthly, on the 
concepts of perceived risk and acceptable risk and the need for the incorporation of 
these concepts into decision making. 
One of the problem areas in risk management hinges on the apparent conflict between 
expert predictions of risk and lay or community perceptions of risk. In recent years risk 
analysts from a number of different areas have attempted to define and explain these 
differences as a first step towards reconciling them. Part of the incentive for this 
development was the public's realisation that well organised community groups were able 
to block new proposals for activities such as waste disposal sites. Experts began to 
recognise that in the interests of ensuring that such activities proceeded without undue 
conflict and considerable delay it was important to find ways of communicating technical 
information to members of the public in a form that they could understand and to which 
they could relate. 
Initially risk communication was viewed as a one-way process from the experts to the 
public, however, it became apparent that the public required more than that, and that 
risk communication had to be viewed as a two-way process if it was to achieve its 
objective of reducing risk conflict. 
This publication describes some of the major features of risk communication, looks at 
current international examples, and recommends ways in which risk communication 
techniques might be used to reduce risk conflict in New Zealand. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
The objectives of this project are to expand our understanding of risk concepts, to 
provide practical approaches for the incorporation of public input into areas where 
(environmental) risk is an issue and to use this knowledge to provide further insight into 
the management process. 
The specific objectives of this publication therefore are to: 
(1) expand our understanding of the risk management process by examining 
alternative means of communicating risk concepts between experts and the 
public with a view to reducing risk conflicts, and 
(2) analyse selectively and recommend options regarding techniques for the 
application of risk assessment, suitable for application by regional and local 
authorities, that take proper account of the public's perceptions of risk and 
hazard. 
1.1 Background 
People's perceptions provide a-valid and required input to both formal and informal risk 
assessment procedures. In recent years the public has become much more aware of and 
concerned about environmental hazard. Part of this concern has arisen because of 
changing attitudes to the environment, reflecting changes in people's value systems, and 
a greater awareness of the importance of environmental health to our own well-being. 
At the same time, recent reading suggests that the direction of research into risk 
perceptions, which has dominated the past 10 years, has now led to a watershed beyond 
which no clear breakthrough looks likely to appear. Early expectations of this work were 
that it would be possible to develop models from which risk perceptions could be directly 
estimated and, hence, acceptable risk determined. It now seems unlikely that this can 
be done. It is, however, now fairly generally accepted that the differences between expert 
predictions of risk and the public's perceptions of risk are due to many complex factors. 
More importantly, there is a growing acceptance that there is no clear-cut 'right' or 
'wrong' in the debate. 
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Early research into risk perceptions was motivated by the feeling that if it were possible 
to understand why people perceived risk in different ways to experts then it would be 
comparatively straightforward to 'educate' people so that they would 'understand' risk 
better and would therefore accept the advice being given by experts. Greater 
understanding of both the factors affecting public perceptions and the reasons why expert 
predictions and lay perceptions differ has modified this intention or eArpectation. 
There have been many attempts to quantify perceived risk and acceptable risk. Over the 
past 12 years three different approaches to estimating perceived risk have been proposed 
and tested. They all suffer from considerable limitations in terms of the assumptions 
required by the method and the data collection methods. Analysis techniques are 
complex and difficult to justify in some circumstances. Current thinking amongst 
practitioners and proponents is that it is unlikely that either new techniques will be 
developed or that current methods will be substantially improved upon and, therefore, 
combination approaches are likely to be most useful. 
The main outcomes from perceived risk research have been the identification of the main 
factors affecting people's perceptions of risk, the recognition that the technical concept 
of risk as a compound of probability and magnitude is inadequate in terms of the way 
most people think about risk, and a greater comprehension of the heuristics that people 
use in their efforts to estimate risk. 
Risk perception research has also provided some insight into risk conflicts. These arise 
when experts and the public differ and are due to many causes. Research into perceived 
risk has highlighted the real social problem that derives from risk conflicts, and that is 
the lack of confidence that the public has in the technical expert. The credibility of the 
expert is now a key issue of risk research reflecting on the credibility of the public-sector 
decision-making processes. 
As a result, and also as a by-product of a certain amount of soul searching as to the 
purpose of research into perceived risk, the emphasis in risk research over the past two 
or three years has been switching towards designing ways of communicating risk 
information. Education of both experts and lay persons is required so that their mutual 
understanding of the issues, facts and values associated with risk will be increased. It is 
a two-way process that also involves the members of the public speaking to the experts, 
describing their concerns, and making their suggestions as to how problems may be 
overcome or avoided. What is being sought is a way to increase the mutual respect of 
the two (or more) parties. 
This new area is known as risk communication. It derives from research into perceived 
and acceptable risk and seeks to find ways of avoiding the costly risk conflicts that have 
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plagued many large and small-scale development projects over the past 10 years. The 
importance of the work in perceived risk and acceptable risk is that it was able to shpw 
that people's perceptions are not simply 'irrational', and that people use a wide variety 
of input information including expert predictions to make their own social evaluations of 
risk. Also, it was necessary to establish that people have rights in determining the level 
of risk (or safety) that they are prepared to accept. 
Another point that needs to be established is that because of the existence of uncertainty, 
particularly in cases where health and environmental risk are concerned, there can be no 
absolute right answer. Therefore, the most acceptable solution to both parties must 
intuitively be reached by a process of trade-off between them. For this to be successful, 
both parties must be prepared to negotiate and to establish a framework for this 
negotiation that will include the areas in which they are prepared to negotiate. Risk 
conflicts typically include elements of value. conflicts as well as interest conflicts and risk 
communication seeks to clarify ways in which these can be defined and properly 
described. 
Risk communication should not be seen as a new and entirely independent area of 
research. Its roots lie in research into perceived and acceptable risk. It is also closely 
associated with the risk decision-making process. Current discussion in Europe is 
considering the role of risk communication in policy development. In the United States 
greater emphasis is being placed on response to risk events and the social impacts arising 
from risk events and risk decisions. This is directed towards improving communication 
between all interested parties. 
The specific task undertaken in this project was to examine the role of risk 
communication as a major component of risk management and as a potential means of 
ameliorating risk conflicts, and to report on current practices. 
1.2 Differences between expert prediction and community perception 
Before proceeding with the discussion on risk communication it is useful to revisit briefly 
the differences between expert predictions and lay perceptions of risk issues~ 
Experts' predictions of risk are generally obtained by means of risk assessment procedures 
that use historical data to calculate statistical estimates of risk either directly or using 
mathematical systems models. Where the data required are not readily available, for 
example in cases where the number of incidents is very small or unrecorded, then 
extrapolation techniques may be required. 
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Lay perceptions of risk are risk estimates made by individuals who use heuristic 
approaches. The main heuristics used are availability, representativeness, and anchoring 
(Tversky and Kahnemann, 1982). A large number of factors have also been shown to 
affect people's perceptions of risk and also the acceptability of particular risks 
(Gough, 1988). The factors that appear to have the greatest influence are the degree of 
control that the individual believes that he/she has over the risk or hazard (the 
voluntariness), the 'dread' nature of the hazard (how feared it is), and the catastrophic 
nature (number of people or area affected). One other important point deriving from 
this work is that people do not necessarily consider death itself to be the greatest hazard 
- type of injury and manner of death (or injury) are given greatest emphasis. 
Experts' perception of risk (and hence the emphasis in estimation) is based on the 
premise that riskiness is synonymous with mortality statistics (Slovic, 1990). This results 
in conflict over different definitions of riskiness since lay people's perceptions include 
perceptions of risk and benefit (hence tolerance of higher risk conditions in the work-
place than in the home or natural environment). 
Experts often state that it can be shown that people are very often quite wrong in their 
estimates of risk, by which they usually mean frequency of occurrence. It can be shown 
quite clearly that people's perceptions are not born out by accident statistics particularly 
when relating to everyday activities such as driving a car. This does not necessarily mean 
that the methods people use to perceive risk are wrong. A number of researchers 
including Slovic (Slovic et at., 1986) have used psychological research methods to show 
that perceptions can have good agreement with statistical risk estimates. One of the 
main factors in the apparent contradiction is the individual's perception of his or her 
degree of personal involvement. 
Another way of expressing this is to say that people take additional factors into account 
when they estimate risk and they measure the magnitude of risk outcomes differently. 
This is in some ways a question of the need to determine relevant information. Experts 
fail to examine the characteristics of risk that are fundamentally important to decision 
makers who act as representatives of the public (Koshland, 1989). 
Fischhoff (1981) lists six reasons why expert and community risk estimates differ and why 
risk conflicts occur. They are that: 
(1) the distinction between 'actual' and 'perceived' risk is misconceived, 
(2) lay people and experts are talking different languages, 
(3) lay people and experts are solving different problems, 
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(4) debates over substance may disguise battles over form, 
(5) lay people and experts may disagree over what is feasible, and 
(6) lay people and experts see the 'facts' differently. 
Many risk debates and conflicts revolve around the question of determining what is an 
acceptable risk. Current work suggests that there is no single level of acceptable risk that 
can be applied across different risk issues, as was originally sought, but that risks can be 
accepted or tolerated under certain conditions that relate specifically to the activity being 
considered. The determination of an 'acceptable' risk parallels the risk assessment 
process and requires the use of risk preferences and the expectation of social utility 
(Gough, 1988). 
1.3 What is risk communication? 
A general definition of risk communication is: "any purposeful exchange of information 
about health or environmental risks between interested parties. More specifically, risk 
communication is the act of conveying or transmitting information between interested 
parties about levels of health or environmental risks; the significance or meanings of such 
risks; or decisions, actions, or policies aimed at managing or controlling such risks" 
(Davies et al., 1986). 
There is no single 'right' way o(estimating or assessing risk and because expert and lay 
estimates of risk are different, does not necessarily imply that lay estimates are 'wrong'. 
Therefore, risk communication should not be viewed as a means for experts to 'educate' 
the public into their way of thinking about the world. It is a two-way process aimed at 
improving the credibility of decisions; it involves the technical community, the public and 
the media. It is a means of transferring information between all interested parties and 
provides an arena for discussing different viewpoints. 
The key feature of effective communication is that it should be a genuine effort to involve 
all parties for the purpose of resolving an issue. In the same way that risk assessment 
should be directed towards making a decision (choice is one of the elements of risk), risk 
communication must have an outcome. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that we can now resolve all risk conflicts. It 
may be that we can provide an extremely effective community participation process 
achieving excellent communication between all groups involved in an issue. However, 
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if the conflict arises from a conflict of values, then there may be no possible solution. 
Information can assist conflict resolution only when there are misunderstandings between 
interested parties, when misconceptions have arisen or when opposing groups are 
prepared to make trade-offs. 
When risk communication processes were initially proposed some experts believed that 
it would be possible to solve all conflict simply by providing the public with 'better' 
information. This has indeed been the case in some instances, however, there have also 
been a number of studies of conflicts where the public is not prepared to accept that the 
experts' viewpoint is 'better' and, with hindsight, most experts who have been involved 
in risk communication processes now have a greater understanding of the public's 
attitudes and concerns. 
1.4 Why communicate? 
The experience of risk communication to date has at times been unsatisfactory for 
everybody involved. Those who are sending messages may feel that they have not been 
listened to or understood, and those receiving the messages may feel that they are not 
being provided with the information they are asking for. Although a two-way 
communication process may be in place, the messages are still missing their targets. 
At the other extreme, a number of excellent risk communication processes are operating 
on an on-going basis, but they are not being recognised as such. 
Risk analysts and decision makers see the process of risk communication as a way of 
potentially reducing conflict between experts and the public. Both experts and decision 
makers have become concerned about the public's apparent unwillingness to accept 
expert technical assessments without question. The public, for its part, is eager both to 
put forward its own point of view as long as it believes that this point of view is being given 
a fair hearing and, for the most part, is in return prepared to listen to expert opinion. 
From the political perspective, risk communication initiatives have arisen from a 
recognition that ultimately 'power' resides with the public. Incidents such as Bhopal, 
Chernobyl, Love Canal and Three Mile Island have shown decision makers that an . 
erosion of public trust can affect areas beyond the immediate focus of the incident. 
Ruckelhaus (1986) refers to this as a "take-back of power". The net effect is that the 
question becomes not why communicate, but how can agencies involve the public arid still 
make effective, efficient decisions. 
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At a different level, the public has been shown to be willing and able to bring economic 
pressure to bear by refusing to purchase products that it believes are unsafe (beef from 
hormone-treated cattle, foods containing certain chemicals etc.). 
The importance of communication and public involvement in decision-making processes 
is associated with the need to 'make decisions stick'. If the public is unhappy about a 
particular outcome then it can reduce the efficacy of a decision by intransigence 
(employing the Polish solution), the instigation of costly appeal processes, and by simply 
refusing to purchase an item. If the public has been involved in the decision there is a 
greater likelihood of commitment to making the outcome work as a result of a sense of 
ownership of the decision. 
7 
At a different level, the public has been shown to be willing and able to bring economic 
pressure to bear by refusing to purchase products that it believes are unsafe (beef from 
hormone-treated cattle, foods containing certain chemicals etc.). 
The importance of communication and public involvement in decision-making processes 
is associated with the need to 'make decisions stick'. If the public is unhappy about a 
particular outcome then it can reduce the efficacy of a decision by intransigence 
(employing the Polish solution), the instigation of costly appeal processes, and by simply 
refusing to purchase an item. If the public has been involved in the decision there is a 
greater likelihood of commitment to making the outcome work as a result of a sense of 
ownership of the decision. 
7 
CHAPTER 2 
The literature 
''As a member of the Commission that was set up to study the Challenger 
Space Shuttle disaster, Dr Richard F eynman spoke to engineers and managers 
about the probability of an accident occurring. He was rather surprised to 
find large discrepancies between the probabilities calculated by engineers and 
those quoted by managers. In the case of the booster rockets, the engineers 
quoted at best a chance offailure of 1 in 1000 whilst NASA (the managers) 
quoted 1 in 100,000. Similarly in the case of the engines, . two engineers 
questioned estimated that the probability of a flight being uncompleted due 
to a failure in the engine as 1 in 200 and 1 in 300, while the manager quoted 
1 in 100,000." Feynman, 1988 
Feynman's interest in the discrepancies described above kindled an interest in the 
processes that managers and engineers used to arrive at these estimates. In both cases 
the engineers used historical statistical estimates of complete system failure tempered by 
some experiential assessment. The managers were quoting from fault tree analysis 
results. Feynman (a mathematician with experience of nuclear systems) found the 
reliability statistics used for this analysis unconvincing and concluded eventually that "it 
was clear that the numbers for each part of the engine were chosen so that when you add 
everything together you get 1 in 100,000". This example illustrates that not only is there 
a lack of communication between experts and the public, but that there is also evidence 
of a lack of communication between experts and managers within the same organisation. 
Environmental risk questions cover a wide variety of areas including health, ecological 
resources, welfare measures and the integrity of the environment as a whole. 
Environmental risk communication issues are similarly broad and may involve decisions 
at different levels; the most common being within plant or organisation management and 
within public-sector decision making. Environmental risk questions tend to score low on 
familiarity and high on dread factors, implying that public perception of the risk is likely 
to be greater than the statistical predictions giving rise to conflict, while at the same time 
science is seldom able to provide definitive answers (Thomas, 1986). 
Risk communication is a form of public participation, but public participation alone 
without commitment to the process on both sides is not a substitute for risk 
communication. Risk communication should not be a publicity-related or promotional 
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exercise (Vonkerman, 1990) but an on-going process with all parties having an input to 
the decision. Risk communication does take different forms and the timing of the 
communication process will differ. Environmental risk issues such as asbestos and ground 
water pollution tend to arise after the event and communication is therefore reactive. In 
siting issues and anticipatory emergency procedures (such as those undertaken by Civil 
Defence) risk communication is required before the event and in instances of emergency 
management risk information is required to be communicated in a real-time framework 
during the event. 
This chapter has been compiled from a substantial bibliography including general 
references on risk analysis. Items referenced in the publication are included in the 
reference list at the end of the publication. This is followed by a more complete 
bibliography of risk communication material sighted. 
2.1 Risk communication as part of the risk assessment process 
Earlier work in this series of publications on risk and uncertainty (Gough, 1988, 1989, 
1990) has used a general systems decision-making approach as a context for the risk 
analysis process (Figure 1). 
Decision-making process 
initiation <--> 
analysis 
-> 
evaluation 
choice of option <--> 
implementation <--> 
Risk analysis process 
(sometimes referred to as 
risk management) 
initiation 
risk determination 
risk assessment 
risk evaluation 
choice of option 
communication and monitoring 
of the decision 
Figure 1 Risk analysis as a decision-making process. 
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Using this framework, risk assessment and risk management are seen as complementary 
and interacting parts of the decision-making process. Risk detennination (the first part 
of risk assessment) is the counterpart of the analysis state and this is followed by risk 
evaluation (the second part of risk assessment). Implementation requires communicating 
and monitoring of the decision. Risk communication, as we are discussing it here, is an 
intrinsic part of risk management. However, it should be viewed as a part of the whole 
process of risk analysis, and not seen as an 'add-on' at the end. Equally, risk 
communication cannot and should not replace effective risk management. 
Communication channels need to be established very early on in any decision process in 
order to improve the quality of the decision. Gregory (1990) argues for an enlarged role 
for risk communication to be paired with an improved basis for determining the origins 
of people's concerns about technologies. 
2.2 Objectives of risk communication 
Risk communication as a topic for independent study arose out of risk perception 
research, itself an attempt to examine people's responses to risky situations and activities. 
There was a strong feeling that if people could be better informed about risks they would 
react in a more 'rational' fashion. However, initial attempts to inform the public did not 
have the expected effect as "the objective of informing the public about risk issues seems 
easy to attain in principle, but, in practise may be difficult to accomplish" (Slovic, 1986). 
Thus, researchers started to recognise that it was not simply a 'non-understanding' that 
caused negative public reactions to particular activities, but that other factors were 
involved. 
In recent years attention has focused on two major aspects of public reaction to issues 
affecting people's health and welfare (environment) that have had a substantial influence 
on the way in which experts, decision makers and the public approach risk issues 
involving siting (in particular nuclear power facilities and hazardous waste sites). These 
manifestations of aversion to involuntary exposure to risk known as NIMBY (not in my 
back yard) and NIABY (not in anyone's back yard) are discussed fully in Tait (1988). 
The conflict in this area has grown out of issues such as the Love Canal, Three Mile 
Island incident and the Chernobyl accident, where scientific expertise has been shown to 
be fallible. Mistrust is consequently generated. Risk communication is therefore 
becoming used to improve scientific credibility and to attempt to increase the acceptability 
of particular risks to the community. 
It must be remembered that it is not possible to change fundamental values through 
communication. Therefore, risk communication should not be directed towards this 
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objective, rather it should be directed towards improving mutual understanding in order 
to facilitate compromises in risk-related conflicts (Renn, 1989). 
The objective of risk assessment is to make 'good' decisions. Therefore it follows that 
the aims or goals of risk communication are to: 
_ improve the efficiency of risk decisions by ensuring that the decisions are 'adhered to~ 
_ provide risk managers with a means of involving parties affected by a decision, and 
- promote channels of communication between aU parties or 'actors' involved in risk 
decisions so as to minimise conflict. 
The aims and objectives of a particular risk communication process reflect the 
perspective from which they are being viewed. The aims listed above attempt to define 
'common goods'. 
Liu and Smith (1990) set out a series of operational objectives for risk communication 
which reflect primarily an agency perspective. They are to: 
_ convey information to and educate the public, 
_ encourage change in behaviour and protective action, 
_ warn the public about potential disasters or emergencies, and 
_ facilitate the solution of problems and the resolution of conflicts. 
There are quite practical reasons for informing the public. In cases of emergency 
resulting from natural hazards and other major hazards, the ability of the public to 
respond appropriately is crucial. The public needs to know what to do. 
Morgan and Lave (1990) consider a further problem of (risk) communication that is one 
of the bases of the (potential) conflict between experts and the public. That is, when 
there is a mismatch between the objectives of the communicator and the recipient of a 
message. The effect of this mismatch depends also upon whether the communication 
is overt or covert. Gregory (1990) reiterates this by pointing out that when essential risk 
attributes are omitted from consideration mis-valuation occurs, thus adding to the lack 
of mutual comprehension and thus reinforcing the conflict. 
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Take, for example, a situation like the siting of a microwave tower. The 
telecommunication agency may enter into the risk communication process reluctantly, 
seeing it as an extension of a process with a foregone conclusion. The individual living 
near the site may be concerned about property values, but be using risk as a surrogate. 
The residents association may have a genuine concern about the riskiness of the tower. 
Unless the specific objectives of the different interests groups can be elicited, it is unlikely 
that any communication attempt will achieve any success. 
Therefore, the goals listed above should be supplemented with to: 
_ (establish) and convey a richer description of risk characteristics and thereby help to 
identify the reasons for conflict (Gregory, 1990). 
For any particular risk management or risk communication process~ the different groups 
involved will establish their own specific objectives that will relate to their own interests 
and expectations of the process. Greater experience of risk communication by agencies, 
managers and the public will lead to more realistic objectives being established, and a 
greater chance of all parties being able to achieve their goals. 
2.3 The benefits of risk communication 
The benefits of good risk communication derive directly from the objectives of the risk 
communication process. Better risk communication leads to better risk management, less 
conflict and more lasting decisions. Established communication channels may be used 
for future areas of conflict and as models for~ther· areas or activities. Even when 
solutions are not achieved, the establishment of communication channels may prove 
valuable as a means of defusing conflict situations. 
Conversely, the effects of bad communication may be long-lasting suspicion of the 
process, the particular issue and science or technology in general, leading to a 
degradation of credibility that can prove very difficult to reverse. 
Young (1990) points out that one of the prime areas of concern for those who are 
promoting risk communication efforts is that "those who should be leading the effort at 
improved risk communication often simply fail to see the benefits that can accrue to 
industry and the community by keeping lines of communication open". This is evidenced 
in many areas and at the present time in New Zealand is most obvious in the apparent 
failure of MAP to recognise the usefulness of the Farm Advisory Service as a 
communication channel at a time when farmers are facing increased exposure to risk and 
are looking to MAP to provide leadership and information. 
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There are a number of general benefits that can accrue to both the public and private 
sector as a result of risk communication. The most obvious include a reduction in 
expensive political confrontation and litigation and the generation of community 
'goodwill' that will benefit both the activity or project directly concerned and other 
subsequent proposals. At a management or plant level the benefits are similar to those 
due to risk assessment and involve the development of better processes for emergency 
planning and response (communication between managers and operators). 
2.4 The actors 
"Citizens want to be, and will be, a part of any siting process." Trimble, 1988 
The actors involved in risk communication are the same as those involved in the public-
sector decision-making process. They include analysts (technical and non-technical), 
managers representatives of the public, specific community interest groups and decision 
makers. They should also include the media and public relations agencies since the 
media provides the most common and accessible communication channel. 
Young (1990) refers to the role of the media and its specific recognition by the National 
Research Council of the United States when stating that "scientists and risk managers 
should recognise the importance of the part journalists play in identifying disputes and 
maintaining the flow of information during the resolution of conflicts". This is in contrast 
to the usual portrayal of the media as a causal factor in the origin of risk conflicts. It is 
much more constructive to view the media simply as a means of communication and to 
promote the risk-- communication process by providing full, comprehensive and 
comprehensible. information to the media. 
The mass media provide very important channels of communication with the public. They 
have a powerful effect on their audience; they are mediated through social interaction 
and personal beliefs; and they are diverse and have (are able to create) diverse impacts 
(Peltu, 1990). Therefore, the media cannot be ignored, but should be recognised and 
used as the useful tool that it is. 
The journalistic criteria of 'newsworthiness' include immediacy, novelty, human interest, 
drama and conflict, exclusivity, negativity and the status of the source. All of these 
factors also have an impact on people's perceptions of risk and therefore risk 
::ommunicators need to find ways of using the media effectively as a means of providing 
information. To do this, risk communicators need to gain greater understanding of the 
way the media operate rather than, as in the past, simply condemning them out of hand. 
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This publication concentrates on risk communication as a public-sector decision-making 
process. This is, of course, not necessarily the case. Risk communication can and should 
occur at a number of different levels including within-plant activities. Time management 
studies have shown the efficacy of ensuring that workers are fully involved in plant 
management. Risk management studies have similarly shown that workers are more 
efficient and safety conscious if they have a greater understanding of why they are 
required to perform certain actions associated with risk. 
2.5 Techniques 
"Doing an adequate job of communication means finding comprehensible ways 
of presenting complex technical material that is clouded by uncertainty and 
inherently difficult to understand." Slovic, 1986 
Slovic is referring to one of the major problems of communication faced by analysts and 
technical experts: the need to provide technical information to people who do not 
understand either the type of information being presented, the assumptions that have 
been made or the objectives for which the information has been generated (which may 
not be the same as the objectives of the decision-making process). 
Beyond this, the simple provision of information is not enough. To be effective, 
information must be presented in a way that the recipient can understand and also accept 
or believe. The problem with risk information is that in the past it has often been 
presented in a 'take it or leave it' form and has not addressed the issues that primarily 
concern the public (see Section 1.2 - the public and the experts are solving different 
problems). 
In their attempts to simplify the information being presented scientists and analysts 
commonly resort to jargon, sometimes as a last resort. It has been noted by psychologists 
that scientists tend to use less jargon in interactions between themselves than when they 
are trying to communicate with the public. This is indicative of a protective mechanism 
to disguise their inherent suspicion of the public's motives and their fear that the public 
will misinterpret the information being given. 
Technical information is not the only information that is relevant in risk issues. Parties 
other than the agency promoting the activity, including the public in general and specific 
interest groups, will have information that is as important from their perspective as the 
technical data provided by the analysts that the promoting agency must accept and 
evaluate. As well as being able to listen to and accept the information presented, the 
recipient must be able and prepared to respond in a manner that allows for dialogue to 
continue. 
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fhe techniques used for risk communication differ depending on whether the situation 
involves within-plant communication or public-sector decisions. This publication 
:;oncentrates on the use of risk communication in the public-sector decision-making 
process, but incorporates areas of internal institution or plant management concern 
Nhere they have relevance. 
[n the context of siting or plant activity risk communication, Young (1990) lists the 
[ollowing set of communication methods: 
_ planning or execution of emergency drills, 
_ distribution of printed material, 
_ private meetings, 
_ correspondence, 
_ speeches, 
_ news publications, and 
_ public meetings. 
He follows this up with a list of simple methods that plant managers can use to 
:;ommunicate risk to the community: 
_ be open, honest, truthful, 
_ be accessible, available, responsive, 
_ meet with community groups, and 
_ explain risks, hazards, operations. 
Methods that the community can use to express concerns about risk issues to managers 
lIe: 
_ be open, express concerns, 
_ understand issues, 
_ be co-operative, 
_ hold meetings, 
_ talk to plant people, 
_ communicate with town officials, and 
_ form strong organisations and citizens' groups. 
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Managers setting up risk management programmes should begin by: 
.. identifying interested parties and developing a dialogue, 
_ accepting the fact that differing perceptions about risk are sincere and strongly held, 
_ avoiding rigid approaches and focusing on the concerns of individuals and local 
groups, 
.. implementing community surveys to monitor trends in risk perception, and 
_ evaluating the effectiveness of risk communication programmes. 
Risk communication requires commitment, and for the process to provide solutions that 
are acceptable, AIL PARTIES must commit themselves to an open and continuing 
partnership. 
Risk perception research has provided one of the main risk communication tools. Social 
scientists are able to add to the tool kit available by constructing surveys and 
questionnaires that analyse the bases and content of lay and expert judgements about 
hazards (Brown and Campbell, 1990). Surveys can also be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of risk communication processes, by investigating before and after 
information (for example, Liu and Smith (1991)). 
The OECD recently adopted a Council Decision-Recommendation concerning the 
provision of information to the public and public participation in decision-making 
processes related to the prevention of, and response to, accidents involving hazardous 
substances (Schulberg, 1990). This is a first step in the implementation of risk 
communication practices. Guiding principles set out the type of information required to 
be provided but the approach suggests that this provision of information is viewed as a 
one-way process from agencies to the public. To date, there has been no evaluation of 
implementation in member countries and very little guidance as to how the process 
should be proceeded with. This suggests that European attitudes are directed strongly 
towards an acceptance of the public's right to know but are still not prepared to involve 
the public directly in decision-making processes. 
Another approach to communication described by Desvousges and Smith (1988) is the 
use of focus groups, primarily as a means of testing and selecting communication 
channels. They suggest that they can also be used to design risk mitigation policies and 
to assess the effectiveness of risk communication. The development of communication 
channels is a crucial aspect of risk communication. It is also important that once a 
channel is established it should not be allowed to lapse without deliberate intent, even 
if it appears that the immediate purpose has passed. Communities' experience with any 
form of public participation should be fostered. 
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The particular methods used for risk communication will depend upon the situation, the 
groups involved and the resources available. Much more work needs to be done on 
establishing the effectiveness of different types of methods and media, with emphasis on 
the ability of a variety of different approaches to achieve different objectives. 
2.6 Incentives 
Incentives may be used by agencies or companies to either get the public involved and 
committed to a process or as a means of compensating groups bearing risk. In the 
former case, incentives would only be required if the agency or company had some 
considerable vested interest in getting the public involved and for some reason the public 
lacked commitment. This might occur, for example, if public assent were required for 
development yet insufficient benefit was perceived by the public. Sadly, our decision-
making processes seldom adopt this 'innocent until proven guilty' stance. 
Incentives for community involvement might include mitigation and enforcement 
(Schmeidler and Sandman, 1988). 
The main type of incentive used, however, is compensation, with emphasis being placed 
on cost-sharing and the redistribution of gains (Gregory and Kunreuther, 1990; Liu and 
Smith, 1991). The difficulty here is that the public may view compensation as a bribe. 
Six basic forms of compensation are: 
_ direct monetary payment, 
_ in-kind awards, 
_ contingency funds, 
_ property value guarantees, 
_ benefit assurances (employment guarantees), and 
_ economic goodwill incentives. 
The effect of these incentives is to redistribute benefits to the host community, thus 
addressing some of the equity questions associated with determining an acceptable risk. 
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Agencies and regulators may also require incentives to become involved in risk 
communication exercises where do they do not perceive any immediate benefits. 
Schmeidler and Sandman (1988, p.113) discuss incentives in greater detail. 
2.7 Examples of risk communication applications 
Liu and Smith (1991) report on a national debate on nuclear power sponsored by 
Taiwan's state-operated power corporation prior to building a new plant. The 
programme involved was extensive including 100 debates and discussion groups sessions, 
50 public lectures, a series of television programmes and newspaper articles and the 
establishment of a neighbourhood compensation fund of over $US6m per year for the 
construction phase, reducing to $US4m per year after operation. Surveys were used to 
determine changes in people's attitudes before and after the communication process 
initiative. Ironically, the model chosen was not able to measure attitudes directly. 
However, the results obtained suggested that after the debate people were less likely to 
favour the proposed plant. The net effect was to increase people's perception of risk and 
hence to harden opposition to the plant. 
An example of 'bad' risk communication comes from the Chernobyl accident and the 
effects on farming in Britain, and particularly in Cumbria. Technical experts made 
assumptions about the dispersal and duration of contamination that failed to take into 
account special geological and vegetal conditions and local knowledge about these 
conditions (Wynne, 1991). As a result, contradictory advice was offered over a period 
of several months, resulting i~ some farmers believing that they were being deliberately 
'trapped'. The situation was complicated by the proximity to Sellafield and the fact that 
the effect on the countryside from routine discharges from the plant had never been 
previously monitored. Therefore, there was doubt as to whether the total contamination 
was in fact due to the Chernobyl fallout. Previous communication problems associated 
with Sellafield discharges had already alienated local residents (MacGill, 1988). 
Scientists' inability or unwillingness to acknowledge uncertainty, or to admit that they 
didn't know (lessons could be learnt from Socrates) severely damaged their credibility. 
The damage caused by this bungling was partly remedied when some scientists visited 
farms and at times stayed with the farmers. The individuals involved did manage to 
communicate effectively, even to the point of the scientists admitting that they 'didn't 
know'. Wynne (ibid.) also points out that this illustrates that the individual scientists and 
technicians were not incompetent or irresponsible, but that the system of institutions and 
dissemination of information was totally inadequate. 
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Weterings and Van Eijnghoven (1989) report on a study of the way in which authorities 
communiCated health risks to local residents in a Dutch soil pollution si~uation. They 
concluded that in this case the communication was characterised more by mis-
understanding and conflict between parties with different views and interests than a lack 
of understanding. They conclude and recommend that it is important to examine the way 
communicators select the risk information that they'present from risk assessments and 
to study the effect this information has on the recipients. Another major factor in this 
instance proved to be the institutional background of the opposing groups, which 
reinforced fixed positions, making it difficult for parties to be flexible. 
As mentioned, timing is an important factor in any approach to risk communication. 
Sandman in Davies et al. (1986, pp.58-59) reports on a situation faced by the New Jersey 
State Government in connection with radon in houses. The state launched a proactive 
information campaign telling residents about the possibility that radon might be a cancer-
causing hazard, before scientific testing had determined the full extent of the problem. 
Obviously, this caused some anxiety and stress as a result of uncertainty. However, as 
Sandman noted, had the state government waited until testing was complete, then there 
would have been considerable public outcry that people had been allowed to continue 
living in conditions known to be potentially hazardous without being given the option to 
make up their own minds about the risk. 
Good communication exercises do not always lead to sitings or solutions. Clean 
Harbours Inc. of Kingston, Massachusetts, withdrew an application to site a hazardous 
waste facility in Taunton despite a careful communications approach by both the 
company and the state during which considerable local respect for the developer and 
media support for the proposal was developed (Davies et al., 1986, pp.71-75). Local 
government representatives believed that, given more time, community support and 
acceptance would have been achieved, however, the company decided to withdraw before 
the formal siting application was heard .. One of the most interesting points about this 
example is that the objectives of the participants were clearly established and open, and 
credibility was not in· question. A further issue that arose was that there may be ways of 
deriving direct benefits in terms of reduction of general health and environmental risks 
as a result of this type of process. 
IAdditional examples and case studies can be found in Krimsky and Plough (1988) and 
Gow and Otway (1989). 
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2.8 Limitations 
There is a common belief in the causal sequence that information will lead to awareness 
which will lead to behaviour. However, as pointed out by Sims and Bauman (1983), 
there is considerable evidence for the breakdown of this causal sequence. They replace 
it with a more cautious statement that "sometimes, under highly specified conditions, and 
if properly executed, with certain target publics, information may lead to awareness and 
awareness may lead to behaviour". Therefore, providing information is not sufficient to 
affect behaviour. 
Further, in case of natural hazards, it has been shown that awareness of hazard is not 
sufficient to trigger response. This emphasises the two-way nature of risk communication. 
It must also be remembered that there are two major types of conflict, interest-conflicts 
and value-conflicts, and that conflict resolution techniques of all types have been shown 
to be ineffective where value conflicts are concerned. Unfortunately, public-sector 
decision-making problems'tend to be problems of inconsistent values (i.e. values of public 
and proponents). The only hope in this situation is to attempt to change attitudes. 
Whilst there is evidence of consid~rable attitude change in areas such as smoking, alcohol 
consumption and the place of women, these changes require long-term education. 
Attitudes towards perceived risk, acceptable risk and the role of risk communication have 
changed noticeably in the past decade and it is important that this process be continued 
for the sake of long-term gain. 
Therefore, risk communication that is successful in terms of the communication process 
may not achieve the objectives of the particular application (resolution of conflict, and 
happiness all around). 
2.9 Ethical considerations 
In a guest editorial to Risk Analysis, Morgan and Lave (1990) address ethical 
consideration in risk communication. They suggest that from the point of view of 
recipients, risk communication messages can be structured in three ways: to broaden 
general understanding, to obtain basic information for a particular decision, and to 
structure a risk decision (i.e. choose criteria). They then divide communicators' motives 
into categories depending on whether the communicator cares about how the inform~tion 
is used. If the communicator does care, then motives can be divided into overt or covert 
categories each with a sub-grouping of altruistic or selfish. 
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In two-dimensional tabular form, this framework provides a useful way of analysing 
particular risk communication examples. "Ethical problems arise when there is a 
mismatch between the objectives of the communicator and recipient of a message." 
Conversely, ethical problems are least likely to occur when communicators are overt 
about both their motives and their approach to risk communication. "Risk messages 
must be understood by recipients, and their impacts and effectiveness must be 
understood by communicators." 
Intergenerational equity is an important moral issue in many risk issues (Maclean, 1989). 
It is particularly relevant in the case of hazardous waste storage sites. The two major 
issues are fairness and rationality. In terms of equity, present generations should be 
required to pay the higher cost, but the distribution of benefits is harder to measure. "We 
have not yet found a procedure that is ideally equitable, reasonable and socially 
acceptable. " 
2.10- Conclusions 
Covello et al. (1986) believe that problems of risk communication tend to fall into four 
main categories: 
(1) message problems, resulting from limitations of scientific methods, analyses and 
assessment, 
(2) source problems, or a lack of (institutional) trust, resulting from the limitations 
of the risk communicators and risk assessment experts, 
(3) channel problems, or selected or biased reporting, resulting from limitations of 
the means by which scientific and technical information about health and the 
environment is transmitted, and 
( 4) receiver problems, for example, increased perceptions, stemming from certain 
characteristics of the intended recipient. 
This viewpoint still considers risk communication as a one-way directional channel or the 
transmission of information from agencies and analysts to the general public. For the 
complete picture, risk communication must be viewed from the perspective of both 
promoters of agencies and the public and its representatives. 
'" 
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There are still a number of definitional problems associated with risk communication and 
niisunderstandings about the process between researchers and communicators, and the 
public. Different groups have different objectives and expectations and will view 'success' 
in different terms. The most important role of risk communication is often, therefore, 
to establish a 'working' communication channel that can be used for different purposes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A model of communication 
"Communication - make it simple, make it clear." Wylie, 1991 
Several authors have written manuals on risk communication of which the most important 
are Hance et al. (1988) and Covello et al. (1989) (see Appendix 1). Otway and 
Wynne (1989) refer to them as "rather clever guides which could also be interpreted as 
etiquette books". Although these are recommended reading for risk communicators, this 
publication does not attempt to duplicate or summarise any of the material from them 
here. Otway and Wynne (ibid.) also state that the manuals approach risk communication 
from the point of view of information transmission from agency officials or plant 
managers to the public and further make the assumption that the communicator is 
behaving consistently, honestly and competently. These assumptions are not necessarily 
consistent with observed behaviour. 
The literature also contains many references to models of risk communication. The use 
of the term 'model' in this context is a good example of the use of jargon since the so-
called models proposed tend to lack logical construction and development and are little 
more than prescriptions. 
This publication does not make any assumptions about the honesty or rationality of either 
the communicator or the recipient and tries to emphasise the importance of two-way 
communication as a pre-requisite for risk conflict 'solution'. The intention of this chapter 
is to extract the crucial elements of risk communication and present them in the form of 
an overall framework, or a structured approach designed to achieve the objectives of 
'good' risk communication. 
The first steps in establishing any model of communication must be to ensure that 
consensus can be reached on the crucial questions of who, why, what and how 
(Lalo, 1990). 
3.1 Who and to whom 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there may be a number of different 'actors' in any particular 
risk communication situation. Any approach to risk communication requires identifying 
all those groups and individuals who might be expected to be involved. This initial 
scoping exercise should be very broad and include those who might be indirectly affected 
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as well as those who have a direct stake or interest. It is better to include some who may 
choose not to be involved than to ignore or neglect groups or individuals who believe 
they should have been included, since bringing them into the proceedings at a later date 
may negatively bias their reactions to the process. 
It may also be necessary to include representation for groups who are not currently 
involved, such as future generations, or prospective tourist interests (in the same way that 
non-market valuation methods attempt to take account of 'existence' values). 
Having determined all the potential actors, it is time to consider the operation of 
communication channels by establishing lines and directions of communication - who 
transmits messages to whom. At this stage the credibility of the actors should be 
considered. Public relations studies performed overseas have shown that government 
agencies in general have high credibility, whilst teachers and journalists have low 
credibility. The media recognise this and often uses agency sources to increase their 
credibility. 
Part of the process of determining who should be involved may involve training and 
mobilising mediators who will identify parties and provide a vehicle for the 
communication. 
3.2 Why 
In any particular instance, the objectives of the specific communication problem or 
activity need to be established. These objectives should be consistent with the more 
general aims or goals of risk communication and should be directed towards why 
communication is necessary or considered to be a common 'good'. The reason for this 
is so that the people involved in the communication process have a good understanding 
of what they are actually trying to do. 
It is important that initiators of a communication process are honest with themselves 
about the reasons for undertaking risk communication. It may not be a purely altruistic 
process. It may be that the proponents of an activity believe that they can manipulate 
the message so that it will become attractive to the recipients. They may be ignoring the 
two-way aspect of risk communication and become confused and angry when the 
recipients demand similar rights. If you are trying to 'sell' something to them you must 
remember that the buyer usually has a choice, and will be selective. 
The National Research Council (1989) offers the following definition of the risk 
communication model (or information-understanding model): 
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"an interactive process of exchange of information and opinion among individuals, 
groups and institutions. It involves mUltiple messages about the nature of risk and 
other messages, not strictly about risk, that express concerns, opinions, or reactions 
to risk messages or to legal and institutional arrangements for risk management". 
The importance of this definition is that it makes the point that risk communication 
models are not confined to communicating information about risk. Because risk is used 
as a surrogate for other issues in many public-sector decision processes (by all parties), 
one of the important initial areas to be considered in establishing why, is the breadth of 
the issues to be included. This assessment may require a mini-communication exercise 
in itself. 
It must be remembered too that the different actors in the risk communication process 
may have quite different objectives. Take the example given in Section 2.2 of the siting 
of a microwave tower, where the different interested parties had different objectives 
expressed either overtly or covertly. A solution to problems of this nature requires trade-
offs which can only be achieved when the real agendas of all parties are out in the open 
(Solomon achieved a solution by forcing the opposing parties to reveal their real 
objectives: in one case the well-being of the child, and in the other simply possession). 
3.3 What 
The message is individual to each situation and should be clearly related to the objectives 
of the particular process. 
All actors involved need to set priorities for the information they are trying to 
communicate but be flexible enough to be able to change that information according to 
the messages they received from the recipients. We are then forced back to the point 
that risk conflicts are not solely about risk. Groups who have been unable to obtain 
information about power pricing, for example, may use the opportunity presented by a 
siting application to request such information and also to promote their own institutional 
banners. Communicators and recipients both need to be aware of the probability of a 
broadening ofthe objectives which may in fact be of assistance in providing areas for trade-
of/so 
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3.4 How 
Genesco (1990) believes that the criteria for 'good' risk communication must be clarity, 
objectivity, and rapidity and regularity. These would appear to be good objectives in 
general, but in many cases not achievable. For example, it is very difficult for promoters 
to achieve objectivity since their whole value structure will have implicit bias in it. It is, 
in this type of circumstance, better for the promoter to admit bias, but to try to answer 
questions as objectively as possible. 
Many authors have listed numbers of do's and don't's which are relevant to risk 
communication. At risk of being repetitive (and in many cases stating the obvious) the 
following lists are included. The sources for these lists include the Public Relations 
Journal (1991), Hance et al. (1988, 1989) and a chapter from the IPENZ publication 
Professional Information which sets out some aspects of communication of relevance to 
the engineering profession. 
DO 
_ avoid secrecy, 
_ help people quantify risk, 
_ communicate broadly, 
_ remember that knowledge of local history and circumstances is essential, 
_ acknowledge that when you are dealing with the public there are no 'dumb' questions, 
_ examine all aspects of your communication, 
_ look for economic issues, 
_ beware of 'killer' words, 
_ identify common themes and deal with them, 
_ take the initiative, especially when you have negative information, 
_ co ... operate on an industry-wide level, 
_ give people time to assimilate complex issues, 
_ avoid 'duelling' scientists (a yours and ours situation), 
_ evaluate your efforts (risk management and communication procedures improve when 
they are properly evaluated), 
_ be frank when dealing with the media, 
_ be available to approaches from journalist and develop good relations with local 
media representatives, 
_ follow some basic rules for preparing news releases concentrating on the questions 
'who', 'what', 'when', 'where', 'why', and 'how', 
_ write clearly and simply, 
_ look for opportunities to tell your own story, 
_ look for ways of developing your profession or agency's profile in the community, 
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.. make sure all members of your organisation are aware of the need for good public 
relations, 
.. be aware of local, regional and national issues, 
admit uncertainties, 
... be aware of the factors that inspire trust, 
_ pay attention to process and explain (agency) process, 
_ be forthcoming with information and involve the public from the outset, 
.. focus on building trust as well as generating good data, 
_ only make promises that you know you can keep, 
... provide the information that the people need (and want - the two may be different), 
enlist the aid of credible community organisations, 
_ pay as much attention to the community's perception of the risk, and to the 
community's concerns, as to scientific variables, 
.. involve the community in the decision-making process as much as possible, 
.. pay attention to process matters, 
.. release information early (even if this means saying that you don't know), 
address community concerns when explaining risk (try to consider their perspective), 
_ put data in context, 
choose risk comparisons carefully, 
_ remember that communities - not the agency - must decide what is acceptable to 
them, 
... remember that effective communication must be supported at all levels of agency 
management, 
.. acknowledge uncertainty, 
_ listen to what groups are trying to tell you. 
DON'T 
.. assume people on the other side of the risk issue don't know the subject, 
assume that low turnout at official meetings means a lack of interest, 
.. rely on the media to tell you how you are doing (that is, evaluate your own efforts), 
.. give mixed messages, 
.. tell the community that things cannot be done because it is too expensive, 
.. provide great quantities of statistics that have little meaning to the general public (try 
to find out what they really want to know about), 
.. alienate your public by using analogies that are meaningless in the context, 
.. make comparisons with risks that the public does not see in the same terms (e.g. 
compare road accidents with nuclear power plants). 
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The do list is much longer than the don't list. This gives emphasis to the final point of 
DO be positive rather than negative (but not to the point of suppressing negative 
information). 
Credibility is one of the major issues associated with risk communication. It is extremely 
easy to lose credibility and very hard to build it up again. This is valid for 
communicators, recipients and the channels employed. Greenberg et ai., (1989) analysed 
a series of network news media releases concerning risk. One of the more interesting 
!.esults was that 71% of the stories cited included one source reference and 41% cited 
.two or more sources. Federal government was the most frequently used source and also 
the most likely to be used on its own. They concluded that journalists try to balance 
competing viewpoints "except where the source is the 'official word' of the federal 
government". However, they also concluded that a greater variety of news sources 
should be provided to counterbalance the emphasis on catastrophes and the distortions 
created by the short time frame allocated to most stories. 
The way in which material is presented is an important aspect of the credibility of the 
information. People react well to graphs and pie charts, but do not react well to statistics 
in terms of percentages especially when dealing with very small numbers. One part per 
million or one part per billion is totally meaningless. Equivalently, publicity stunts such 
as offering to drink a glass of water output from a sewerage plant offends the intelligence 
of the public. 
The high cost of alternative technologies or approaches is often given as a reason why 
these alternative approaches cannot be used. Agencies and promoters should remember 
that citizens and community groups are often prepared to contribute to or pay all of the 
additional costs. A recent local example derives from a mediated dispute over the use 
of a gravel pit near Rangiora, Canterbury, in which Gay Pavelka (of the Centre for 
Resolving Environmental Disputes, an associate of the Centre for Resource 
Management) was the mediator. As part of the 'solution' to this dispute (which 
contained risk aspects in terms of road safety) the residents agreed to arrange tree 
planting. The public's willingness-to-pay for improved environmental quality has also 
been established by the producers of 'green' products and foods with (apparently) 
harmful chemicals. 
The timing of communication is another crucial aspect. When, depends upon the type 
of risk situation such as siting, emergency preparedness or emergency response. For 
prospective projects the emphasis should be on commencing the communication process 
as soon as possible by informing the public immediately the project is planned or as soon 
as any evidence of risk becomes apparent (such as in the New Jersey radon case). In 
many cases one of the reasons given by promoters as to why a project should proceed 
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has been that planning is too far advanced for changes to be made. The public's reaction 
has been understandably negative. The public prefers the option of making up its own 
mind given the available evidence. 
Risk communication can be an expensive process. This publication does not consider any 
questions of who should pay. It must be remembered, however, that the cost of not 
communicating can often be greater than the cost of communicating in terms of lost 
production, litigation and compensation. 
3.5 Uncertainty 
'Learning to say 'J don't know' may be one of the most important communication 
lessons." Hance et al., 1989 
Risk communication must take account of uncertainty. Experts are often loath to admit 
that they simply don't know what some of the possible outcomes may be on the grounds 
that the remainder of the information they present may be discredited. There is an 
historical belief (common still in the medical profession) that people are not willing to 
accept a 'don't know' answer. This has led to the use of jargon to disguise areas of 
uncertainty. On the other hand, as scientists, risk analysts implicitly recognise uncertainty 
in their modelling approaches by making assumptions. The difficulty appears to be in 
communicating these assumptions in a way that does not (apparently) negate the validity 
of the remainder of the analysis. 
Analysts and scientists are beginning to recognise that the public is more discerning than 
previously believed, and that in the present day, the public is more prepared to accept 
an answer that admits areas of uncertainty than they are prepared to accept the 
paternalistic 'trust me, I know what I am doing'. Members of the medical profession are 
slowly beginning to acknowledge this and reject the mantle of infallibility forced on them 
by a frightened public by recommending that patients should look for a second opinion. 
As pointed out by Hansson (1989), the public often considers reliance on inaccessible 
technological and scientific knowledge as a factor of uncertainty when judging 
technological projects. On the other hand, experts see this type of selective release of 
information as the appropriate way of informing the public (too much technical 
information could be misunderstood). However, open disclosure of all information 
including areas of uncertainty is more likely to gain credibility and to bring the public 'on-
side' than the past processes of not admitting a lack of knowledge. 
29 
3.6 Trust 
Schmeidler and Sandman (1988) present a major section on trust concentrating on the 
perception of trust, the importance of trust and operatiomil definitions of trust, including 
consideration of trust between parties involved in disputes and communication processes, 
and trust of the process itself. 
Trust can be eroded, lost by incompetence, the withholding of information, denial of 
vested interest, the use or suspicion of influence, and a refusal or inability to involve the 
public in risk decision making (O'Riordan et aZ., 1989). Therefore, risk regulators, 
analysts and promoters need to promote ways of building and maintaining trust by 
demonstrating that risks have been fully examined and reduced to as low a level as 
possible, that the benefits occurring to the process are in the public interest and that 
appropriate emergency response procedures have been established and are operational. 
The orucial message is that unless trust can be established between all parties involved 
it is unlikely that an enforceable solution will be reached. Trust is hard won and easily 
lost. 
3.7 Critical path 
Risk communication will not occur in a vacuum. In most cases either a promoter or a 
regulatory agency will become the facilitator or manager of the risk communication 
process. 
This promoter must: 
(1) set clear objectives for the particular proposal or activity, 
(2) involve as wide a group of interested parties as possible, 
(3) clarify the objectives and motives of the parties, 
(4) prepare a preliminary design of the process (to be communicated to all parties and 
evolved dynamically), 
(5) prepare information taking explicit account of uncertainty, 
(6) design feedback procedures, and 
(7) evaluate the process. 
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CHAPTER 4 
New Zealand context: the issues 
New Zealand has not yet faced the major risk conflict situations that have concerned 
Europe and the United States over the past decade. One reason for this is that these 
have focused largely on large scale questions such as nuclear power generation and 
hazardous waste disposal. The first of these areas of concern is still not an important 
issue in New Zealand, although it has been raised as a diversionary tactic at times. The 
second area is of concern to a number of groups and agencies, but it has not yet surfaced 
as a major focus of general public attention. There have, however, been indications of 
the potential for risk conflicts over the siting of the LPG storage facilities, an application 
for a food irradiation plant, microwave tower locations and hazardous substance storage 
in the Western reclamation area (Auckland city). There have also been many small local 
area issues (including waste disposal) in which greater attention to 'good' risk 
communication could have produced more equitable and less contentious results. 
Part of the time preparing this publication has been spent speaking to different 
individuals and groups around New Zealand to obtain some idea of general attitudes 
towards technological and environmental risk and the overlap between them. One of the 
most obvious conclusions from these discussions is that a number of different groups are 
currently incorporating very effective risk assessment procedures into their standard 
operations without recognising that that is what they are doing. A good example of this 
is the Plant Protection Unit of MAF, where risk assessment has been conducted on an 
informal basis according to a set of established guidelines for a number of years. The 
Unit is now formalising these procedures and beginning to introduce more sophisticated 
approaches including elements of cost-risk-benefit analysis. 
Risk assessment is th~refore not new in New Zealand, but is an integral part of many 
standard procedures established as codes or guidelines. 
Similarly, risk communication is not 'new' or novel either. The Farm Advisory Service 
of MAF has for many years operated as a communication channel between farmers and 
the scientific and technical researchers of MAF. This has proved to be an effective two-
way communication channel with farm advisors acting as communicators. One of the 
features of the service is that the communicators have been trained primarily as farmers 
rather than as communicators so they have used their own professional judgement to 
determine what the message should be and how it should be communicated. 
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Another example of an established communication channel is the Civil Defence Service. 
This is mainly a one-way communication system with Civil Defence providing the public 
with information on what to do in cases of emergency. The efficacy of this 
communication channel is hard to judge since Civil Defence situations do not occur often. 
However, instances such as public reaction to flooding in Greymouth and a recent power 
blackout in Christchurch indicates that there is good public awareness of emergency 
response procedures as promoted by Civil Defence. 
One of the main features of Civil Defence is that it is a very reputable and credible 
source. Regional councils and government agencies could make greater use of Civil 
Defence procedures to provide information on other emergency response activities. 
However, this approach should be approached carefully so as to avoid jeopardising the 
credibility of Civil Defence. 
The Resource Management Act devolves considerable powers and responsibilities to 
regional authorities. A new emphasis on impact assessment and the need for public 
participation is going to mean that the regional authorities will need to establish 
communication channels with industry and with their constituencies. 
The Farm Advisory Service and Civil Defence are examples of communication channels 
that ,have been institutionalised or established to perform over an extended time period. 
Other processes will require the establishment of channels of communication specific to 
the particular process. In either case, the dynamic nature of the risk communication 
process should not be ignored. Institutions and procedures should be assessed and 
modified continually. 
Monitoring of risk communication involves monitoring both the process and the channel 
of communication. Since all parties involved in a process will have differing views as to 
the success or otherwise of the process, to ensure the credibility of the process the 
instigating agency should establish criteria for evaluation in conjunction with the process 
itself. The way in which this monitoring is seen to be done may enhance the credibility of 
the agency itself. 
Therefore, New Zealand needs to place emphasis on: encouraging institutions and 
agencies currently involved in risk assessment to recognise the validity and utility of their 
procedures, enhancing the credibility of agencies and institutions likely to be involved in 
risk communication exercises, considering ways of providing comprehensive and 
comprehensible technical information to the media and the public, and exploring 
imaginatively the establishment of communication channels (either as institutional 
arrangements or flexible processes). 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
"Ultimately, however, the most important lesson to be learnt from Chernobyl in 
the West is that any attempt by governments to control information can only 
generate distrust and resentment. The US has already formalised this lesson. It 
introduced the Freedom of Information Act in direct response to the outcry caused 
by its attempts to manipulate information about the conduct of the Vietnam War. 
In Britain, as in other European nations, such legislation is long overdue. If we 
had such an act in place - in other words, if political authorities had shown greater 
trust in the public's ability to make up its own mind on sensitive and controversial 
topics - then some of the worst political fallout from the Chernobyl accident might 
well have been avoided." New Scientist (editorial) 20 April 1991 
Citizens want to be involved. 
Good interactive communication is the key to resolving risk conflict. It is necessary but 
it may not be sufficient to guarantee solution. 
Risk perception research provided valuable insights into the way people perceive risk and 
how they judge the acceptability: of risk. This research derived from the expectation that 
if the public were provided with 'the true facts' then opposition and conflict might be 
reduced. However, a major result of this research was that risk is defined differently by 
lay people and experts, that lay people adopt a broader perspective on risk and include 
consideration of many more factors, and that lay people are not prepared to accept that 
the expert definition is necessarily 'better'. 
One of the outputs from this research into the origins of people's perceptions of risk was 
the concept of tolerable risk, or risk that people are prepared to tolerate under certain 
fixed spatial and temporal conditions. Risk communication derives directly from risk 
perception research because people will tolerate risk only if they believe that they are 
being treated fairly and given sufficient information to make their own judgements as to 
the relative safety of the situation. 
If we wish to encourage the solution of risk conflicts then we need to place more 
emphasis on the use and development of risk assessment approaches that provide 
information that can easily be communicated to and understood by all sectors of the 
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community. Event tree and fault tree analyses are complex mathematical techniques 
which produce apparently simple answers that should not be used in isolation from the 
analysis itself. Recent developments in the area of risk comparison methods where risks 
are ranked according to their spatial and temporal characteristics may provide a simple 
and effective means of demonstrating 'riskiness'. More emphasis should be placed on 
the use of graphical type presentations. 
Risk communication is an interactive and cumulative process. Communicators and 
decision makers should not be disheartened by an apparent inability to counteract or 
change opposition to a specific project. As pointed out by Payne and Williams (1985) 
conflict is a normal part of social system adaption. Thus, 'good' risk communication does 
not necessarily mean that a 'good' solution will be reached or that there will be any 
solution. The objectives of the different parties involved may be such that they are 
irreconcilable. Good process does not guarantee good results (Whipple, 1989). 
The particular methods used for risk communication will depend upon the situation, the 
groups involved and the resources available. Much more work needs to be done on 
establishing the effectiveness of different types of methods and medium, with emphasis 
being placed on the ability of different approaches to achieve different objectives. 
This publication does not consider questions of who should pay the costs of risk 
communication or examine legal frameworks, which vary considerably between countries. 
As stated earlier, the cost of not communicating can often be greater than the cost of 
communicating in terms of lost production, litigation and compensation. Good summaries 
of legal and institutional requir_ements in the United States and Britain can be found in 
Baram (1990) and Walker (1990), respectively. 
5.1 1(ey factors 
The critical factors of any approach to risk communication (viewed from the perspective 
of an agency promoting the process) are: 
_ involve as many individuals and groups as possible, 
_ establish the objectives and agendas of all parties, 
_ use as many different means of communicating as possible, 
_ explore different approaches to communication, 
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om pay particular attention to presentation when communicating information, 
... be credible, 
... evaluate the process and results carefully, 
... don't be discouraged if it doesn't achieve your objective (for the process), and 
.. be prepared to learn from the experience. 
5.2 Recommendations 
Regional councils are going to be placed in the position of having to establish procedures 
for involving the public in decision-making processes where risk may be a factor. 
To facilitate these processes, it maybe appropriate for the regional authorities to 
establish and undertake risk communication exercises. Regional authorities therefore 
need to be fully aware of the implications of undertaking such exercises and to 
understand the benefits available. 
Public agencies have a direct communication role in actively promoting efficient, effective 
communication practices. 
Further research should concentrate on evaluating selected examples of risk 
communication exercises to determine some of the elements of 'success'. Suitable case 
studies for this purpose would be the risk assessment study of the Western Reclamation 
area in Auckland co-ordinated by the Auckland Regional Council, the Wellington/Hutt 
Valley sewerage plant, and the siting process for the Christchurch City Council transfer 
stations. More recent local examples would also be useful. 
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Appendix 1 How to do it 
A number of agencies and particular interest groups have published 'manuals' or 
presented methods for risk communication which deal with their specific area. One of 
the best general approaches has been published by the Environmental Communication 
Research Programme, Rutgers University, New Jersey as part of a programme sponsored 
by the Division of Science and Research (DSR), Department of Environmental 
Protection of the State of New Jersey. 
This manual, which is based on interviews with academic experts, industry 
representatives, citizen leaders and agency staff in policy, technical and community 
relations positions, contains guidelines and anecdotes illustrating applications and is 
directed towards agency practitioners. 
It is well presented, clear and easy to follow, and supplemented by a workbook. It has 
the stated aim of being a "first step in investigating better ways for agencies to generate 
productive dialogues with communities". Since the publication of these two books, the 
DSR has established a three-person Risk Communication Unit as well as a continuing 
effort to promote productive interaction between agencies and communities. 
Improving dialogue with communities: a risk communication manual for Government. 
1988. Hance, B.J., Chess, C. and Sandman, P.M. Environmental Communication 
Research Programme. Rutgers University. New Brunswick. New Jersey. 
Planning dialogue with communities: a risk communication workbook. 1989. Chess, C., 
Hance, B.J. and Sandman, P.M. Environmental Communication Research 
Programme. Rutgers University. New Brunswick. New Jersey. 
A further guide has been published by Covello et al. (1989). It takes the form of two 
'manuals' one for government agencies and the other for plant managers, containing 
prescriptive material for improved risk communication. This guide is another 'applied' 
text, however, at present it is difficult to evaluate its effectiveness without illustration of 
application. 
Effective Risk Communication. 1989. Covello, V.T., McCallum, D.B. and Pavlova, M.T. 
(Eds). Plenum Press, New York. 
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